Security
Only the latest release receives fixes. This is alpha software controlling paid infrastructure; use provider spending alerts and inspect the provider console when cleanup is uncertain.
Reporting a vulnerability
Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting if enabled. If unavailable, open an issue requesting a private contact without including exploit details, keys, account identifiers, or private data. Private reporting must be enabled by the maintainer before the public launch. There is no promised response time.
Trust boundaries
- A job TOML is executable code. Its setup and command run on a rented machine; its input/output paths select local data to upload or overwrite. Review jobs before running them. Do not run gipper as local root.
- Providers and host operators can access uploaded data and job output. SSH
currently disables host-key verification for ephemeral endpoints; it does not
authenticate the remote host independently of the provider's endpoint data.
Output archives come from that trusted host and are extracted locally with
system
tar. Use a dedicated local account or container for untrusted work. - The remote bootstrap downloads and runs the uv installer from astral.sh if uv
is absent. Provider images and job dependencies are additional supply-chain
trust decisions. Pin your job image and dependencies where reproducibility
matters.
bin/runpod-mcpis an optional developer helper that executes the latest third-party MCP server via npx; it is not installed by the package. - Provider keys stay local and are sent in API headers. Use environment variables
or a mode-600 dotenv file. Known provider key values are redacted from API
errors and receipts, but arbitrary secrets printed by jobs are not detected.
The
[env]name check is a guard, not a general secret detector. gipper custody reportlists what reached rented machines, for use after a provider incident. It covers what passed through gipper or was declared; see docs/custody.md for its limits. Custody manifests hold file paths and hashes, and fingerprints are keyed hashes, never secret values.- Receipts include paths, provider resource identifiers, host addresses, and commands; logs and collected files can contain sensitive job data. Restrict filesystem permissions and review everything before sharing it.
- Cleanup uses provider APIs. A killed client, offline user manager, unavailable
API, or failed reaper can leave a machine billing. Remote
timeoutends the command, not the rental. Check the provider console if closure is unconfirmed. Budget estimates/caps are client-side safeguards, not provider-enforced limits. - The reaper manages all resources named
gipper-*in each configured account, including ones not in its local ledger. Reserve that namespace and coordinate multiple clients/accounts; use a dedicated provider account when appropriate.
Serverless queues
Serverless TOMLs select an image and optional executable entrypoint. Treat both as code. Handler inputs and outputs pass through the provider queue. Gipper records canonical JSON input hashes and job identifiers, while applications own the actual evidence. The existing Pod custody report and billing reconciliation do not include serverless receipts. Minimum workers are zero, but idle worker tails can bill. The separate serverless reaper only manages recorded, expired temporary endpoints; deliberately deployed endpoints require explicit deletion.